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Manhattan’s Chinatown is the oldest and used to be the largest Chinese community in 
the East Coast of the United States. Since the repeal of Chinese Exclusion Acts in 
1940s, it experienced great expansion, tremendous population influx and significant 
real estate redevelopment. As a community located next door to the world class 
financial district, Chinatown has been under the pressure of gentrification for decades, 
people keep on moving to outer-borough communities. However, Chinatown is still a 
low income community and persists highly mix- used land use pattern, comparing 
with other downtown Manhattan communties. Why Chinatown has gentrifed later 
than other communities in downtown Manhattan? To answer the question, this 
planning history study examined four cases in the second half of 20 century, which 
are Chinatown Street Revitalization Study of 1976, Special Manhattan Bridge District 
of 1982, East Village/Lower East Side Rezoning of 2008, and Establishment of 
Chinatown Business Improvement District of 2011. Based on discoveries, a group of 
recommendations were provided for Chinatown community groups; among them are 
preparing for a Section 197a plan, promoting Chinatown with the goal to make it the 
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When people visit a Chinatown, they find extraordinary exotic enjoyments. 
They look at the brands and advertisement with Chinese characters, listen to people 
speaking Cantonese and Mandarin, enjoy Chinese foods, and even buy Chinese 
gadgets. As a unique ethnic enclave emerged in 1820s, Chinatowns are usually 
located in center area of big cities, such as San Francisco, New York and Los Angeles. 
They add a significant decoration to the “patchwork” of American cities. They arose 
over a  hundred years before the secondary or “satellite” Chinese enclaves arise of 
the 1970s (Chen, 1992), and serve as starting point for new Chinese immigrants and a 
“holy land” of everything related to China for Chinese-Americans. Chinatowns even 
play a very important role as a bridge between China and the United States.  
Challenged by demographic and socioeconomic changes, Chinatowns finds it 
increasingly difficult to maintain their uniqueness and are even disappearing. A new 
generation of Chinese-Americans is less connected with their ethnic background and 
less willing to stay in Chinese enclaves as did their parents and grandparents. The old 
generation is reducing its ability to shape its traditional community; and new Chinese 
immigrants with their diversified cultural backgrounds are moving in from mainland 
China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong (Chen, 1992). Chinese immigrants of this new wave 
speak more fluent English, better understand the cultures of the United States, and are 
more eager to live life as  “mainstream” Americans. They come with not only their 
hope for the new life on this continent, but also knowledge, skills and even huge sums 
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of capital, which enable them to be independent from the old Chinatowns. As a unique 
urban built environment, Chinatown is losing its influx of new Chinese immigrants.   
Manhattan’s Chinatown is the biggest Chinatown in the United States in terms 
of population (U.S. Census Bureau, 2010), and the most influential one on the east 
coast. Under the renaissance of economic growth and real estate market from 1980s to 
early 2000s, communities in Manhattan downtown area, e.g., Lower Manhattan, East 
Side, Greenwich Village, and Tribeca, have gentrified; higher income groups are 
gradually dominating these communities. Comparably, Chinatown is the last 
low-income community in Manhattan downtown (The New York Times, September 
16, 2009). However, in addition to the regional gentrifying trend, Manhattan’s 
Chinatown is also experiencing the same threat as other American Chinatowns, 
declining dependence of new immigrants. At the beginning of the new century, 
Manhattan’s Chinatown was adversely impacted after the attack of September 11th, 
2001 due to the panic and a long period when transportations access was shut down. It 
took a long time to recover from the adverse impact (Asian American Federation of 
New York, 2002).   
This research is trying to bring answer to this question: why Chinatown has 
gentrified later than other communities in downtown Manhattan? What role did the 
municipal government of the City of New York plays in shaping Manhattan’s 
Chinatown? How did the community react in municipal policies such as affordable 
housing provision, special districts, rezoning and other planning initiatives? This 
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research looks at the planning history of Manhattan’s Chinatown since 1950s. By 
exploring the demographic, social and economic background and the dynamics that 
shaped the planning results there, this research will help local community, planners, 
governmental officials, and the general public to understand how gentrification can be 
controlled, and to think about the future development of Chinatowns in the United 
States. 
II. Background 
1. A Brief History of Chinese in the U.S. 
The first significant wave of Chinese immigration to America began with the 
California Gold Rush of 1848-1855 and continued with subsequent large labor 
projects, such as the building of the First Transcontinental Railroad (Norton, 1923, p. 
105). During that time, “China was plagued by economic chaos, famine, flood, and 
political unrest, which included civil war and an extensive peasant protest in southeast 
China known as the Taiping Rebellion”(Lin, 1998, p. 24). Poor peasants found it 
difficult to make a living, and they were contracted to work abroad, including in the 
United States. They departed from Hong Kong, Canton and Macao which were treaty 
ports open to international trade and labor exports after the Opium War of 1839 (Lin, 
1998). Most Chinese laborers were Cantonese; i.e., local people of Canton 
(Guangdong) province.  
Excluded from the rights of U.S. citizenship by the Naturalization Law of 1790, 
Chinese immigrants were treated as “bachelor sojourners” who temporarily worked in 
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the status of resident alien laborers. As the gold in the San Francisco Bay area became 
harder to mine and large-scale economic depression occurred, animosity towards 
Chinese immigrant workers grew on the west coast (Chang, 2003). White laborers 
killed Chinese workders and lobbied Congress to pass the Chinese Exclusion Acts of 
1882 which banned Chinese from working in mines. Chinese workers had to settle in 
enclaves in cities, mainly San Francisco, and were constrained to work in laundries, 
restaurants and grocery stores. The first great geographic dispersion of the Chinese 
from the West to the Midwest and East Coast happened from 1880 to 1910 was the 
result of their poor treatment in California  
During the exclusion era, the total number of Chinese in United States decreased 
from 107,488 in 1890 to 74,954 in 1930 (Chen, 1992). Some voluntarily went back to 
China or were forced to leave, while others stayed. There were three reasons for them 
to stay: pay off their debts from coming to the U.S., send back money to support their 
family in China, and fight to reunion their families with a big wealth. They 
concentrated in Chinatowns to find shelter and help each other, living under the same 
family name and bound by cultural obligations to those subgroups. They lived in 
Chinatown also as an economic base. In order to avoid confrontation with the white 
working class, Chinese workers had to find jobs in the industries that did not directly 
compete with white workers, like commercial laundries and restaurants. In the 1920s, 
some 37.5% of all Chinese workers in New York City were engaged in laundry work 
(Zhou, 1992).   
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Because of the Exclusion Act, Chinese workmen were not allowed to bring their 
wives and families to the U.S., and the Chinatowns were actually bachelor enclaves 
(Lin, 1998). In the early 20th century, there were 4,000 men and 36 women living in 
Manhattan’s Chinatown (Zhou, 1992). Until 1960, the sex ratio of New York City 
Chinatown was 212, which means there were 212 men for every 100 women (as cited 
in Yuan, 1974). Many of those who stayed in the United States have descendants who 
are not recognizably Chinese because of inter-races marriage (Chang, 2003). Those 
descendants were not living in Chinatown.  
Unlike the laborers, the merchant or entrepreneur class of Chinese were 
permitted to bring their wives to the U.S. and raise families here. However, the arrival 
of these females was rare. From 1906 to 1924, only about one hundred and fifty 
Chinese women secured legal permission to enter the United States (Chang, 2003). 
Another group of early Chinese that came was Mandarin-speaking, wealthy scholars. 
Most of them also went back, as required by the Qing Empire government which had 
sponsored their study abroad.  
When the Chinese Exclusion Repeal Act of 1943 was passed, Chinese who had 
entered the country lawfully were given the right to naturalization (Chang, 2003). The 
Chinese War Bride Act of 1946 allowed thousands of Chinese-American veterans of 
World War II to bring wives and children to the United States as special non-quota 
entries (Lin, 1998). Combined with an annual quota of 105 Chinese admitted, as 
provided by the Chinese Exclusion Repeal Act, the Chinese population grew to 
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117,629 after 1950 (Chen, 1992). 
Since the 1950s, sojourners were transformed into settlers. When the Communist 
Party took power in 1949 in China and with the extreme anti-Chinese propaganda of 
the McCarthy era, the Chinese in America were afraid of going back to China. Their 
relatives in mainland China experienced decades-long harassment and deprivation of 
economic and political rights in a series of political movements only because of their 
“oversea relations” (Zhou, 1992, p. 36) 
At the same time, about 5,000 students, tourists, businessmen, government 
officials, journalists, and other temporary visitors were stranded in the U.S. when the 
Kuomintang regime was driven out of mainland China. These temporary visitors, 
combined with other intended political refugees, were naturalized to U.S. citizens and 
consisted of another group of Chinese-Americans with higher education, more wealth 
and higher social status (Chen, 1992).  
The passage of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 repealed the 
discriminative quota of 105 Chinese per year and extended the ceiling to 20,000 for 
each independent country. This brought the third wave of immigration. Between 1966 
and 1975, 205,107 Chinese immigrants from Taiwan and Hong Kong were admitted 
to the United States (Chen, 1992, p. 6). From 1982 to 1986, 220,087 Chinese 
immigrants were admitted, among them 126,132 from mainland China (Zhou, 1992, p. 
76). A huge number of immigrated to New York City’s Chinatown and it grew very 
fast and became the largest Chinatown in United States with a population of 238,919 
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in 1990 (as cited in Lin, 1998). Chinese population in New York City grew at a fast 
rate in the past four decades (Chart 1).  
2. Chinatown: the Last Low-Income Community in Downtown 
Manhattan 
Manhattan’s Chinatown is located in the downtown area, and its history can be 
dated back to as early as 1858 when a Cantonese men named Ah Ken, who 
established his residence on Mott Street, opened a cigar store on Park Row (Lin, 
1998). It emerged under the background of the strong antipathy of Chinese laborers 
on the west coast of late nineteen century, and grew in the Second World War and 
Cold War era when Chinese-Americans experienced their springs and winters with the 
ups and downs of the U.S. – China relationship. Canal Street encloses the historical 
core to the north, Baxter Street to the west, Worth Street to the south and The Bowery 
Street to the east. The slum block between Baxter and Mulberry was torn down to 
make space for Columbus Park in 1911 (Map 1). With an expansion of more than one 
hundred years, Chinatown has grew many times. Its north boundary was pushed out to 
Delancey Street, forming a neighborhood with Nolita and the East Village. 
Simultaneously, it has expanded east to the Broadway and west to Monroe Street, 
connecting with the Lower East Side (Map 2).  
The major section of Manhattan’s Chinatown is located in Community District 
Three, within Lower East Side.1 Its west part is within Community District 2, under 
an administrative jurisdiction with Greenwich Village, SoHo, NoHo, Little Italy, 
                                                     
1 Established by local law in 1975, New York City has its 59 community districts system to “illustrate the 
remarkable diversity of the city’s land uses and population” 
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Hudson Square and the Gansevoort Market. The area of Community District 1, 
closely located to Chinatown’s south, includes Tribeca, Battery Park City, City Hall, 
South Street Seaport, the Financial District and Civic Center.  
As a community located in the downtown Manhattan area close to world class 
communities like the Financial District, Greenwich Village, and Tribeca, Chinatown 
was the only low-income community. According to 2011 American Community 
Survey 5-year estimates, most census tracts within Chinatown area indicates a median 
household income of less than $45,000 (Map 3); comparably, this number for 
Manhattan was $67,204 (U.S. Census Bureau, 2011). A bigger contrast are, the 
contiguous communities like the East Side, South Street Seaport, Battery Park City, 
Tribeca, SoHo, and Hudson Square, are well-off communities. Most of census tracts 
located in these communities have a median household income of over $95,000. 
Experiencing decades-long gentrification process in the second half of 20 century, 
most communities in Downtown Manhattan area have been transformed from ethnic 
enclaves (East Side), industrial base (Tribeca), and seaport mercantile (Financial 
District) to upper moderate income residential communities and zones for restaurants, 
bars, and art galleries. Chinatown is the last low-income community in Downtown 
Manhattan area. 
3. Satellite Chinese enclaves in New York City 
Ninety percent of the Chinese immigrants who entered the U.S. between 1947 
and 1952 were women and New York City became a major destination for these new 
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immigrants. Garment shops emerged to solve the employment problem of new female 
immigrants (Bao & Ma, 2010, p. 58). Until the 1990s, garment shops and restaurants 
were two economic pillars for Chinatown. These garment shops had become 
gradually less competitive with their counterparts in Asia and Latin America, and 
finally came to an end in the 21st century.  
The influx of new immigrants and emergence of garment shops in 1970s caused 
housing conditions in Manhattan’s Chinatown to deteriorate. Until 1990, more than 
49% of Chinatown households were living more than one person per room as opposed 
to just 10% of Manhattan households. Several loft manufacturing buildings were even 
transformed into dormitory rooms for garment workers (Lin, 1998).  
New Chinese immigrants, especially those from Taiwan, came with a huge 
amount of capital. They came to invest in the real estate market in Chinatown, and 
“bought with eye closed” (Zhou, 1992, p. 105) to pour money into real estate 
investment. Chinatown through is not big enough to absorb all of the foreign Chinese 
capital and zoning regulations limit all new development to six stories. This led land 
values, property values and rents to outrageous heights. Deteriorating housing 
conditions and increasing housing and rent prices made Chinatown difficult to 
accommodate new immigrants. 
Many residents and business were forced to relocate to emerging new 
Chinatowns in Queens and Brooklyn i.e., Flushing, Corona, Sunset Park and 
Sheepshead Bay. These outer borough Chinatowns are connected to Manhattan by 
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subways (Map 4). Spacious apartments and houses attracted newly-arrived, 
well-educated Taiwan immigrants (Chen, 1992). Flushing and Sunset Park have large 
commercial concentrations while Corona and Sheepshead Bay are mainly residential. 
Residential occupation varies in these new Chinatowns. Sunset Park is more similar to 
Manhattan’s Chinatown with a large percentage of laborers. However, Sheepshead 
Bay accommodates more professional, managerial and technical residents. Household 
income and home ownership is also much higher in these outer borough residential 
Chinese communities. Comparably, the percentage of Chinese in Manhattan is 
decreasing (Chart 2).  
4. A Brief History of Urban Planning Practices in the Second Half of 
20th Century as Background 
Urban planning practices shaped American cities in an unprecedented large scale 
during second half of twenty century. As responses to the need of practices, planning 
theory also experienced tremendous paradigm shifts. Planners are no longer 
encouraged to conceive grand blueprint plans, but to listen to local communities’ 
concerns and play a coordination role between community activists, developers and 
local government (Birch, 1996).  
The period between World War II and the early 1960s saw two simultaneous 
processes: the leaving of the white middle and working classes for the suburbs and the 
consolidation of ghetto boundaries (Thomas, 1994). A wide use of private vehicles 
and the return of veterans with assistance of home mortgage insurance programs 
provided middle class ability to flight to the suburbs. The Black and other minority 
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races were left behind in city cores with dilapidated housing, crime and ghettos of 
poverty (Thomas, 1994).  
Inherited from 1930’s strong government liberalism, the federal government took 
action to fund slum clearance and urban redevelopment to revitalize central business 
districts (CBDs) and urban communities on the margin of CBDs. At the state level, 
laws were passed as early as 1941 to delegate power of eminent domain from states to 
cities (Rohe, 2009). The Federal Housing Act of 1949 started federal efforts to remove 
city slums and construct public housing. The Federal Housing Act of 1954 provided 
the allocation of public housing units for families displaced by urban renewal projects 
and allowed commercial development on cleared urban lands.  
A series of public facilities were built during that time in New York City to secure 
the city’s status in commerce, culture, education and health care. Such projects 
include Lincoln Center, the Brooklyn civic center, and the expansion of New York 
University, all of which replaced old factories and tenements (Jackson, 1995). With 
the help of federal money, New York City also built more than 100,000 units of public 
housing, mostly in large developments on slum-cleared land (Birch, 1996).  
The Housing Act 1954 also required working programs for grants, many 
municipalities prepared their first comprehensive plan, and planning departments 
grew rapidly with the Section 701 grants (Rohe, 2009) New York City experienced a 
growth of planning power. However, no comprehensive plan was developed. During 
these years, Robert Moses, the city’s redevelopment administrator, blocked 
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comprehensive planning (Jackson, 1995), instead, focusing on specific projects and 
the zoning ordinance to change the city incrementally.  
In 1969, the planning commission developed a comprehensive plan, the 
six-volume Plan for New York City. However, it was immediately controversial and 
never adopted. Failing to consult the public and being inaccessible, if not to experts, 
were two major flaws (Jackson, 1995). Until now, New York City still does not have a 
comprehensive plan; some of the reasons are the separation of planning powers, a 
powerful real estate industry, and deep suspicion about the wisdom of planning 
(Murphy, 2011).  
The urban renewal and construction of public housing destroyed viable 
communities, usually without adequate compensation, and reinforced racial 
segregation. Newly built public housing was criticized as impersonal, oversized, and 
overemphasized the role of physical planning to solve social problems (Jackson, 
1995). Although the goal of federal housing acts was to provide good quality, 
affordable housing to the urban low income population, it in fact “leads to a 
significant net loss of affordable housing in individual communities and overall” 
(Rohe, 2009, p. 214).  
During the 1960s, militant protests against clearance and redevelopment activities 
happened in a series of cities. In a rebellion in Detroit of July 1967, thirty-three 
people died, 347 were injured, 1,000 buildings were destroyed by fire, and total 
property costs soared to over $50 million (Thomas, 1994). Growing mistrust of 
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authorities in terms of residential displacement was prevalent around the country 
(Marcuse, 1990). 
A variety of critics pointed out that existing comprehensive planning and urban 
renewal projects ignored the needs of existing neighborhoods along with their social 
diversity; it excluded citizens from meaningful participation. Jane Jacobs and Charles 
Abrams were two famous leaders of this community empowerment movement. 
Jacobs’s book Death and Life of Great American Cities attacked urban renewal 
projects and the popular “tower in the park” planning style, and advocated for the 
value of traditional neighborhood. Abrams led the planning program in Columbia 
University, where students were trained to dedicate to social justice (Jackson, 1995).  
At that time, widely discussed on planner’s conferences and planning journals 
was how to bring greater planning attention to social issues like health, education and 
employment (Jackson, 1995). The concept of communicative planning was raised to 
see the role of planner as a mediator of community discourse rather than creator of a 
technically rational plan (Fainstein, 2012). Davidoff (1965) and other proponents of 
advocacy planning suggested that the appropriate response to inner city conditions 
was for planners to stop trying to represent the public interest, an impossible task. 
Rather, they should empower disenfranchised groups. Krumholz (1982) introduced 
the efforts to practice equity planning in Cleveland between 1969 and 1979 and 
encourage planners to be equipped with more boldness in practicing equity planning.  
At the same time, the federal government was also reforming the planning 
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structures and encouraging community engagement. Authorized by the Economic 
Opportunity Act of 1964, the Community Action program and Model City addressed 
the shortcomings of urban renewal and traditional social service programs, by 
involving citizens in the design and implementation of neighborhood improvement.  
The Model Cities program, tackled social issues more directly. It provided money 
with job training, improved education, additional recreation opportunities and other 
services for inner-city residents. Another focus was community economic 
development, which created community-controlled organizations to bring economic 
investment back to central-city neighborhood, and shifted the responsibility for 
developing comprehensive neighborhood plans from municipal planning departments 
to neighborhood-based community development corporations (Rohe, 2009). 
A new trend of municipalities sponsoring neighborhood planning came into being, 
aimed at encouraging citizen-run community organizations to develop their own plans, 
review and comment on publicly or privately developed plans before they come up 
for city council approval, and engage in self-help activities (Marcuse, 1990) In New 
York City, a City Charter revision in 1963 established 59 planning areas with 
community boards as a municipally sponsored or controlled community organization 
to address what happens near their home with continuous citizen involvement 
(Marcuse, 1990).  
City Charter revision in 1975 established the Uniform Land Use Review Process 
(ULURP). It required community boards and borough presidents to hold public 
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hearings before any development is considered by the planning commission and City 
Council. It de facto empowered community boards by setting a “playing rule” for 
community to be involved in local planning issues. A City Charter revision in 1989 
reformed the planning commission, enlarging it to a 13 members, of which the mayor 
appoints seven; the public advocate, one; and each of the five borough presidents, one. 
The appointment system gives the boroughs much more representation than they 
formerly had, as a response to the decentralization trend in planning decision-making 
(Birch, 1996). The ULURP, combined with the establishment of community board, 
provides citizens much more power on community planning issues. As concluded by 
Eugenie Birch (1996), although neighborhoods can rarely stop a project, they are 
empowered to shape projects to be more compatible with their districts. That power is 
inclusive and demonstrable to decision-making bodies.  
III. Literature Review 
Comparing with the huge amount of books, articles and papers discussing 
Manhattan’s Chinatown, few of them talk about planning. “Planning” is defined here 
as implemented and failed governmental-initiated and community-initiated physical 
plans, and zoning changes.  
Zhou Min’s book, Chinatown, The Social economic Potential of an Urban 
Enclave (1992), illustrates the change of Chinese immigrants’ attitude towards real 
estate investment. Although Chinese traditionally value real estate and regard it as an 
important indicator of success, the Chinese sojourners before the exclusion era had no 
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interest to hold real estate in the U.S. Their only goal was to send money back to 
China. After 1943, the exclusion acts were repealed, and Chinese immigrants started 
to think about staying in the U.S. and buying properties. New immigrants in 1960s 
and 1970s moved in with capital and desire to invest in real estate market. Zhou 
identified late 1970s and 1980s as the lift-off time for Chinatown’s real estate 
investment, which most of the money coming overseas, leading to a series of conflicts 
concerning the redevelopment of the historical Chinatown.   
Lin (1995) provided a dualist paradigm to understand conflicts in redeveloping 
Chinatown. Two polarized circuits are described: the lower circuit as the garment 
industry, restaurants, grocery stores, which provide jobs and services for low income 
class; and the higher circuit, international banking industry and local redevelopment. 
The redevelopmental orientation of the upper circuit has clashed with the interest of 
the lower circuit, which depends on preservation of the existing inventory of 
tenements and of the low cost of loft-manufacturing space. “The local state (the City 
of New York) has generally acted in the interests of upper circuit capital, but there are 
some indications that it also has some interest in preserving lower-circuit activities”. 
These conflicts were reflected as battle on gentrification issue over zoning changes 
and redevelopment policies in Chinatown. What interests most is both the powers for 
gentrification and against gentrification arose within Chinese Americans.  
In The New Chinatown, Peter Kwong (1996) provides an insight to the 
mechanism of gentrification pressure in 1980s’ Chinatown: the normalization of 
21 
 
U.S.-China relationship in 1979, the increasing of Chinese immigration quota from 
20,600 to 40,600 a year, and infill of Hong Kong immigrants with fear of 
reunification in 1997, brought a huge amount of housing demand and investment 
supply to Chinatown. Although family association-owned tenant buildings in core 
Chinatown and rent-control buildings were difficult to sell and too little vacant lots 
for high-rise development, significant square feet of garment loft building were 
transferred to office buildings and upper-income apartments. Banks were more 
inclined to extend credit for real estate development instead of industries, e.g., 
garment factories and restaurants.  
Tarry Hum (2010) considered minority community nonprofit organizations 
engaged in political action to push local community board discussion and agenda 
towards inclusion and redistributive equity. Two Chinese immigrant enclaves in New 
York City, Flushing and Sunset Park, are analyzed. She concluded that nonprofit 
organizations played a role to incorporate community resources and powers to be 
strong enough to negotiate with the community board and the city on constructions 
and rezoning issues. It provides an insight to understand the community organizations’ 
role in Manhattan’s Chinatown’s planning-related events to discuss with local 
authorities and solve local planning issues. 
Lin’s book, Reconstructing Chinatown: Ethnic Enclave, Global Change (1998) 
provides a narrative description of a series of planning-related events in 1950s to 
1990s, among them are the oversea Chinese investments in Chinatown’s real estate 
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market, the municipal effort to establish the Special Manhattan Bridge District, the 
proposal of Chinatown Business Improvement District, construction of the city’s 
Men’s House of Detention and Chun Pak building, and Chinese workers unions’ 
demands to get involved into state project like the Federal District Court for southern 
New York and US General Services Administration. These descriptions illustrate the 
major players and how they combat on the gentrification issue of Chinatown. 
Umbach and Wishnoff (2008) described the planning policies and shaping of 
Manhattan’s Chinatown as strategic self-orientalism. By examining three planning 
efforts in Chinatown’s history, the Chinese Village in 1950s, the Chinatown Street 
Revitalization Plan in 1970s, and the Unity Arch in 2000s, this paper reveals that city 
power and community organizations’ willingness to shape Chinatown in an 
orientalism style, as an effort to attract tourism. However, these efforts did not get 
support of local residents, since they don’t think it is worthy of paying huge amount 
of public dollars for tourists, instead of solving immediate community needs. The lack 
of improvement on public environment also contributes to postpone gentrification.  
 Brueckner, Thisse and Zenou (1999) addressed the question why European city 
centers are rich while downtown U.S. cities are poor. Endogenous historical amenities 
as legacy of distant past, ongoing investment to maintain historical amenities to attract 
tourism, the politically importance of central cities are features make city centers in 
Europe be attractive to the wealth while unaffordable to the poor. However, most of 
the U.S. cities are not equipped with these advantages.  
23 
 
Manhattan’s downtown is an exception. As one of the oldest urbanized area in the 
new continent, Manhattan’s downtown accumulated a huge amount of historical 
amenities, which serve as must-see attractions for tourists. Combined with a strong 
political power to get ongoing local government investment to maintain these 
attractions, Manhattan downtown attracts not only tourists but also wealthy people. 
Downtown gentrification in Manhattan is an inevitable trend.  
Marcuse (1984) addressed the problem of gentrification and displacement. He 
illustrated the factors that led to gentrification in 1980s New York City: the shift of the 
economy from manufacturing to services, proportionately increasing use of white 
collar people instead of unskilled manufacturing and service workers, and the 
expanded needs of business for downtown commercial and office space. He also 
proposed rent stabilization policies to combat displacement, including rent regulation 
and condominium and cooperative conversion controls, support for anti-displacement 
efforts, community-level land use decisions as well as anti-displacement zoning tools, 
e.g, conditional zoning requiring suitable lower-rent units are provided with each 
higher-rent unit developed. The Manhattan’s Chinatown’s evasion from gentrification 
involves a group of policies and efforts mentioned in this paper, some of them will be 
picked up for case studies in this research.  
IV.  Methodology 
To answer the question why Chinatown has gentrified later than other 
communities in downtown Manhattan, this research will firstly identify major 
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planning-related events in the time period between 1943 and the present in 
Manhattan’s Chinatown. In 1943, the Chinese Exclusion Repeal Act was passed. It is 
an important time point in that Chinese in the U.S. were allowed to settle down and 
build their families. Since 1943, Chinese have started to purchase real estate instead 
of sending most of their earnings back to China, which is important in shaping of 
Chinese enclave’s built environment.  
Major planning-related events are defined as federal, state and city-government 
initiated plans and policies and their implementation that have impacts on the physical 
environment of Manhattan’s Chinatown. These major planning-related events also 
include influential community proposed plans and policies. Real estate investments 
and redevelopment projects that were involved in major planning-related events are 
also counted.  
Among all identified major planning-related events, the 1976 Street 
Revitalization Plan, 1982 Special Manhattan Bridge District, 2008 East Village/Lower 
East Side Rezoning, and the 2011 establishment of Chinatown Business Improvement 
District were selected to conduct case studies to answer the research question. The 
criteria to select are the relevance to the research question, level of interactions 
between municipal power and the community in the events, as well as availability of 
data. 
The 1976 Street Revitalization Plan and the 2011 establishment of Chinatown 
Business Improvement District were related to the municipal and community’s efforts 
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to boost tourism in an effort to support local businesses and job creation. These efforts 
served to improve physical amenities of Chinatown, which helped to attract not only 
tourists but also the wealthy, but a positive externality to local poor is an improved 
physical environment.  
The 1982 Special Manhattan Bridge District was a rezoning action that the city 
took to increase the development ability of Chinatown, which is highly suspicious that 
this might lead to gentrification, while also possibly supporting the community and 
increasing low-income class’s living standards. The 2008 East Village/Lower East 
Side Rezoning was the third largest rezoning initiative in Bloomberg’s administration. 
As a preserving rezoning for gentrified East Side community, Chinatown community 
distrusted it may squeeze development demand to the adjacent ungentrified 
Chinatown. Based on this rezoning, the Chinatown community proposed their own 
plan to create special Chinatown district to preserve the ethnic enclave and its 
low-income housing storage.  
I. Major Planning-related events in Manhattan’s Chinatown in Post 
Exclusion Era 
Major planning-related events in Manhattan’s Chinatown in the second half of 20th 
century are identified in Appendix A as a chronological table, showing the time, major 
initiator, funding sources, and impacts on Chinatown.  
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V. Four Case Studies 
Case 1: 1976 Chinatown Street Revitalization Study 
Since 1965, the passage of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, huge 
amount of immigrants from Hong Kong, Taiwan and Mainland China have been 
liberalized, which provided Manhattan’s Chinatown with a steady influx of new 
residents. The growing number of residents made Chinatown “one of the most 
successful commercial areas” in New York City (Fowler, August 18, 1976). As stated 
in the street revitalization plan, Chinatown is a “booming area, experiencing rapid 
growth due to increased immigration and all the consequent problems of 
overcrowding on the streets and in apartment” (Department of City Planning, 1976). 
For example, at the busiest intersection of Mott and Bayard Street, 7,500 people an 
hour on weekdays and 10,000 an hour on Sundays walked by, which meant that the 
sidewalk commonly narrower than 15 feet were often jammed day and night.  
Funded by the National Endowment of the Arts, the Department of City Planning 
received $50,000 to conduct street revitalization studies in 1975-1976 for four areas 
with a focus on improving the street life. These four study areas had similar 
“problems of circulation and amenities for pedestrians”, but all “have in common a 
basic vitality of street life”. Chinatown was one of the four study areas.  
This study area was limited to the core Chinatown, the eleven blocks bonded by 
Canal Street, Bowery Street, Worth Street and Baxter Street (Map 5). By identifying 
the major problems bred by its vitality as structural obsolescence, pedestrian conflicts, 
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solid waste nuisances, and luck of cultural and artistic displays, the study proposed to 
construct a private parking garage to replace on-street parking spaces, widen 
sidewalks, realign curbs to serve truck-loading, negotiate with carters for Sunday 
pick-ups, as well as temporary exhibitions of art, sculpture, music and festivals. An 
information kiosk was also proposed to enrich leisure opportunities for residents and 
visitors 
The 1976 Chinatown Street Revitalization plan was born in an era of starving 
public budget (Shefter, 1992).The street revitalization plan stated straightforwardly in 
the preface that the City had virtually no funds available for capital improvements, 
and there would be no large-scale projects proposed in the report. According to The 
New York Time, the only large construction stated in this plan, the public parking 
garage on a vacant site on Baxter Street, depended on negotiations with Hong Kong 
interests, because “the city’s capital budget has run dry”(Fowler, August 18, 1976). 
Actually, the vacant site is still vacant and is a surface parking lot (Picture 1).  
Most of the initiatives were not materialized right after its release, but latterly 
came into being with other efforts. For example, the visitors’ information kiosk was 
built in December, 2004, funded by the Lower Manhattan Development Corporation 
(LMDC) and the September 11th Fund, to promote tourism and help to recovery from 
the attack of September 11th ("Chinatown Visitor Kiosk Opens," 2004). The solid 
waste-cleaning proposal happened through the setup of Chinatown BID in 2011. 
However, the widening of sidewalk is still not implemented, and pedestrian 
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congestion is still prevalent. The narrow historical streets and necessity for local 
businesses to have access to freight trucks made the proposal to widen the sidewalks 
difficult to implement. Congesting sidewalks do resemble commercial streets in 
Chinese cities, giving the street an oriental atmosphere, which also make local retail 
and restaurant owners feel that it may bring businesses (Picture 2).  
Two reasons can be reflected in the failure of materializing the street 
revitalization plan at 1970s. One is the deficiency of public investment at that time; 
the city government had no resources to spend on the street improvements. On 
another hand, Chinatown was accommodating an influx of immigrant population, 
which made it over-flow its borders, invading the Little Italy to the north, “creating 
some friction with” (Fowler, August 18, 1976) the neighborhood. The Chinese 
community and business benefited from the growing population, and the tourist trade 
grew even without the realization of the plan (Wishnoff, 2008). 
Case 2: 1981 Special Manhattan Bridge District 
Among the influx of new immigrants, growing fortunes was brought to 
Chinatown with Chinese immigrants from Hong Kong and Southeast Asia. 
Anti-Chinese riots in Malaysia and Indonesia in fear of the spreading of communism, 
the uncertainty of Hong Kong after 1997 reunification drove oversea Chinese and 
people in Hong Kong to immigrate and divert their money to the U.S. (Kwong, 1996). 
Although they are more proficient in English than any generation of Chinese 
immigrants before them, they still preferred to live in Chinatown, because the life 
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style was much more similar to their previous living environment.  
These wealthy immigrants increased housing demand in Chinatown, pushed up 
the housing prices and rents, bringing the first upsurge of threat of gentrification. 
Their overseas capital input also made it possible for new housing developments, 
rather than simply buying existing houses. In 1981, three privately-financed housing 
projects in Chinatown started with oversea investment, targeting at the increasing 
demand for luxury housing. These were the first privately financed housing projects 
in 20 years in Manhattan’s Chinatown. The city also realized the changing real estate 
environment in Chinatown; as early as 1979, the City Planning Commission had 
started to conduct the Manhattan Bridge Area Study, exploring the possibility of 
rezoning part of Chinatown area to accommodate the growing demand for new 
development.  
In March, 1981, the Board of Estimate adopted a zoning amendment to create the 
Special Manhattan Bridge District, “to encourage the development of new housing on 
sites requiring minimal residential relocation and the establishment of such facilities 
as day care and senior citizen centers”(Wang, September 20, 1981). The special 
district was roughly bounded by East Broadway, Pike Street, St. James Street and 
Monroe Street. Two of the three privately-financed housing projects, Henry Street 
Tower in 60 Henry Street and East West Tower on Henry Street between Catherine 
and Market Streets, are all located in this special district (Map 6).  
According to the City Planning Commission Report (June 22, 1981) , the Special 
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Manhattan Bridge District (SMBD) was initiated to “preserve the residential character 
of the community and encourage the development of new housing”. The “new 
housing” projects, as written in the report, were all required to have Special Permits, 
thus allowing the Commission an opportunity to review the design. Incentives to 
provide community facilities, low and moderate income housing, as well as 
rehabilitation of existing older housing stock were provided in the special district 
amendment. With all the provisions and incentives, the Planning Commission aimed 
at “seizing a unique opportunity to incorporate into new projects, amenities which 
would benefit community residents as a whole, in accommodating the free market 
demand for new construction” (C. o. N. Y. City Planning Commission, June 22, 1981). 
Indeed, the market demand for new housing was enormous at that time. According to 
a news article in The New York Times in November, 1982, the developer of the 
143-unit East West Tower received 400 applications for the apartments that would 
cost at least $150,000. These applicants were mostly local business people (Cohen, 
November 14, 1982). However, this was not an affordable price for the majority of the 
Chinatown population. A typical family in Chinatown at that time was “the wife 
works in a garment factory, and the husband in a restaurant”, as Charles Wang, 
executive director of Chinatown Planning Council said, “They couldn’t afford 
$150,000 condominiums”. 
The Special Manhattan Bridge District (SMBD) provided floor area bonus for 
community facilities, as well as dwelling units for low and moderate income families. 
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For every square foot of floor area provided for use as community facility2, the total 
floor area permitted could be increased up to 7 square feet; for low and moderate 
income housing, the number was 2. The amendment also provided special floor area 
transfer provision for rehabilitated buildings. For every square foot of floor area 
which was demolished in a rehabilitated development lot and transferred to a 
receiving new development lot, the total floor area permitted could be increased by up 
to six square feet.  
The Special District’s spirit was to encourage infill development, instead of 
redevelopment (C. o. N. Y. City Planning Commission, June 22, 1981). To apply for 
the grant of special permit, the developer had to “clearly indicate that the site is vacant 
or substantially vacant 3 ”, in addition, the relocation of residential tenants was 
regulated through submitting an relocation plan to the Department of Housing 
Preservation and Development, showing that relocation should be in the SMBD to the 
extent possible and affirming no harassment of tenants had occurred. The Special 
Permit for East West Tower, mentioned formerly, was withdrawn because of shutting 
down heat and hot water and other harassment from landlord in one of the tenant 
buildings on its development site (Wang, September 20, 1981). 
The Special District was distrusted by the community for its potential to induce 
gentrification. Tenants and local community groups initiated a series of lawsuits to 
challenge this zoning amendment. The first suit started right after the rectification of 
                                                     
2 Community facility was limited to the following activities in Special Manhattan Bridge District: senior citizens 
centers, day care facilities, educational facilities, a combination of above.  
3 “Substantially vacant” means less than 10% of the zoning lot contains residential buildings. 
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the special district in 1982, which Lai Chun Chan Jin and other tenants sued the Board 
of Estimate of City of New York, alleging the zoning amendment was void because of 
insufficient notice of the hearings before the Community Board and City Planning 
Commission pursuant to the Uniform Land Use Review Procedure (ULURP). In May 
1982, the Supreme Court upheld the plaintiff and nullified the special district, based 
on the judgment that the only publication in the City Record was insufficient 
notification, especially for a community where English is not a first language. Later 
the City appealed to the Court of Appeals of the State of New York, and the Supreme 
Court’s decision was reversed, based on the reasoning that “a public notice which was 
complied with the provision of the statue will be upheld even though arguably a better 
method could be devised”. The public hearing for the SMBD zoning amendment was 
complies with the provision of Section 197-c, the ULURP process ("Lai Chun Chan 
Jin et al., v. Board of Estimate of the City of New York," 1984). The attack on 
procedure failed, but the community did not give up the lawsuit effort to protect 
Chinatown from potential threat brought by the rezoning.  
In 1983, the N.A.A.C.P’s triumph to fight against discriminative zoning across 
the Hudson River brought new hope to the Chinatown community. Asian American 
for Equality (AAFE) sued the City based on the Mount Laurel II4 doctrine, which set 
forth the New Jersey obligation of municipalities to zone to satisfy the housing needs 
of low- and moderate-income persons. In 1987, the Appellate Division of the Supreme 
                                                     
4 Southern Burlington County N.A.A.C.P v Township of Mount Laurel, 97 N.J. 158, 456 A.2d 390 (1983),  
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Court rejected the adoption of Mount Laurel II doctrine in Chinatown, reasoning that 
the SMBD is only a 14-block area, which is much smaller than the Mount Laurel II 
applicable housing regions in New Jersey. The latter are larger than four counties. In 
addition, the SMBD area is “one of the most densely populated areas in the county”, 
which is substantially different from the suburban communities like Mount Laurel. 
Therefore, the AAFE’s request was turned down ("Asian American for Equality et al., 
v. Edward Koch," 1987). 
When the attack on SMBD failed, community groups sued regarding the special 
permits issued pursuant to the SMBD provisions. The most famous case was Chinese 
Staff and Workers Association (CSWA) et al., v. City of New York. In this lawsuit, 
CSWA and other community groups argued that the Henry Street Tower’s 
environmental impact review for the special permit was arbitrary and capricious, 
failed to consider that introducing luxury housing into Chinatown community would 
accelerate the displacement of local low-income residents and businesses, therefore 
altering the character of the community. The suit was appealed to the Court of 
Appeals of State of New York, which upheld the community’s argument and nullified 
the special permit for the Henry Street Tower. The court reasoned that the EIS failed 
to consider the long-range comprehensive integrated plan which includes other 
contemporaneous or subsequent actions. Although the construction of Henry Street 
Tower did not cause any displacement, it was “not dispositive for displacement can 
occur in the community surrounding a project as well as on the site of a project” 
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("Chinese Staff and Workers Association et al., v. City of New York," 1986). Until 
1986, two luxury housing constructions in the SMBD, East West Tower and Henry 
Street Tower had their special permits nullified.  
The Special Manhattan Bridge District terminated on September 1, 1991 in its 
zoning amendment, and was not re-enacted by that date. Since the very beginning of 
the legislation of SMBD, the Chinatown community showed strong hostility to it, 
worrying about the potential hazards of its introducing luxury housing and raising 
rents and housing prices in the whole area. As the SMBD zoning amendment stated, 
its goals are “to preserve the residential character of the community” and “encourage 
the new development of new housing”. Even though only infill development would be 
allowed, the indirect impact of new development would not be limited to the site it 
occupied. The two goals conflicted. To build new housing, very limited incentives 
(although they did exist) were provided for affordable housing. Compared with the 
incentives to provide community facilities (which was 7 square feet per square feet 
community facilities provided), the affordable housing incentive did not matter 
(which was 2 square feet per square feet affordable housing provided). In addition, 
developers were more inclined to build senior citizens centers, day care facilities, and 
educational facilities adjacent to their project, simply because it is a premium 
attraction for their development; while affordable housing could be a nuisance for a 
luxury condominium. 
The SMBD brought the first two condominiums (Henry Street Tower and East 
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West Tower) to the Chinatown community, to “promote the opportunities for people 
to live in close proximity to employment centers in a manner which is consistent with 
existing community patterns”. As early as the 1970s, Chinatown has become a center 
of international banks and other financial services (J. Lin, 1995), which created a 
group of employees who were comparably well paid. Adding a significant number of 
owners of garment factories and restaurants – the economic pillars of Chinatown 
(Kwong, 1996), a group of the wealthy individuals have stronger affordability and 
willingness to pay to live close to their working site and the community they belong 
to. They provide the market demand for luxury housing. This is the conflict within 
Chinese community which has an internal economic circulation and significant 
income gap between its wealthy members and poor members (Zhou, 1992). 
Therefore gentrification is contentious: if staying ungentrified, the wealthy may 
have to live outside, which deteriorates the community’s ability to improve its 
environment and makes the poor’s life unlikely to become better off; if getting 
gentrified, living costs (increasing rents, or longer commuting time) of the poor goes 
up, which impairs their ability of the wealthy to make profit on their businesses 
(higher labor expenses, less demands for their goods and services). If it is possible to 
differentiate and prevent activity of buying well-off housing to invest instead of living 
by themselves, gentrification may be controlled, but it is difficult and against the free 
market spirit in a capitalism society. 
 On the other hand, new development will always replace the old. Many 
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buildings in Chinatown were 19th century tenement buildings, which were in very 
poor condition and very high density. According to Virginia Kee, chairman of 
Community Planning Board 3’s Manhattan Bridge Area Committee, who played an 
important role in the enactment of the SMBD, “rehabilitating the old tenant building 
cost a lot”. If new development were repelled, the existing housing environment 
would continue to deteriorate. Therefore, even though tenant housing is kept low rent 
under housing programs like Section 8, the quality of living will still decrease. As the 
Chairman of City Planning Commission said in 1983, the Manhattan Bridge Area 
study showed there was little new construction of housing but the population kept 
growing. It was simply because “existing density of Chinatown tenements was 
substantially higher than the density permitted under zoning resolution, any new 
construction replacing obsolete old tenements could not provide an equal number of 
dwelling units” ("Asian American for Equality et al., v. Edward Koch," 1987). 
 Regardless, the two luxury housing projects were successfully blocked by the 
Chinatown community; the Special Manhattan Bridge District, although it survived 
two legal attacks, finally expired in 1991 without reenactment. In a sense, 
gentrification was slowed down with the effort of community groups. However, the 
demand for luxury housing, as well as the path of deteriorating of aged tenement 
housings did not stop.  
Case 3: 2008 East Village/Lower East Side Rezoning and Community 
Planning for Special District of Chinatown 
For more than two decades past, the Chinatown community desired the rezoning 
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rather than repeal it. Although their demands were in completely different direction, 
their goal remained the same, to protect “a vibrant, mixed-use neighborhood of 
affordable housing and small business in buildings of two to six stories in height” 
from speculative development (Coalition to Protect Chinatown and the Lower East 
Side, 2009, p. 7).  
On November 19, 2008, the City Council approved the zoning amendment to 
rezone 111-blocks of Lower East Side (Haughney, November 19, 2008), which was 
the third largest rezoning since the city's adoption of the 1961 Zoning Resolution. 
According to its City Planning Commission (CPC) Report, this rezoning plan was a 
protective downzoning with specific goals to “foster new development that reflects 
the existing built character of the area”, and “create new opportunities for affordable 
housing along identified streets” (City Planning Commission, p. 4). To fulfill these 
goals, the zoning primarily made these changes (Map 7, Map 8) 
 Established maximum allowable building heights and required street walls, 
requiring new development to be designed contextually. Existing zoning designation 
for the whole Lower East Side was universally R7-2, of which building height was 
governed by the sky exposure plane. The rezoning changed the designation to R7A on 
two sides of major streets, i.e., First, Second, A, B, C, Avenues, and R8B for the area 
100 feet off major streets. R7A sets maximum building height of 80 feet, and 75 feet 
of the number for R8B. R7A and R8B both require the street wall to be as deep as 
adjacent street walls to keep new development being consistent with existing build 
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character (Department of City Planning, 2011, p. 40). In addition, maximum 
community facility Floor Area Ratio (FAR) was decreased from 6.5 of R7-2 to 4.0 of 
R7A and R8B.The zoning resolution text was modified to add East Village/Lower 
East Side a designated area of Inclusionary Housing Program (IHP) applicable to 
wide streets area, specifically, it is C6-2A and R8A along the East Houston, Delancey 
Streets, and Avenue D. Using the IHP, the floor area may be increased by 1.25 square 
feet for each square foot of affordable housing provided, up to the maximum FAR – a 
bonus of 33% for providing 20% units affordable (Department of City Planning, 2011, 
p. 118). 
Under the City’s ULURP, the rezoning initiative was examined by the community 
board. Public hearing were held by Community Board Three (CB3) for this rezoning 
proposal. CB3 recommended that anti-harassment and anti-demolition provisions 
governing Special Clinton District should be included here; and publicly owned sites 
should be identified to meet the City’s commitment that 30% of all housing built in 
rezoned area shall be permanently affordable. On May 27, 2008, the CB3 voted 
unanimously in favor of the rezoning plan and recognized that it would “preserve our 
community”. Nevertheless, the CPC did not incorporate any of recommendations 
made by CB3 into the zoning amendment.  
 In general, it was a preservation rezoning. By reducing FAR for predominately 
residential area, setting maximum building height, requiring contextual consistent 
design, and providing Inclusionary Housing Program, the East Village/Lower East 
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Side Rezoning’s provisions served the goals of preserving existing built character and 
providing opportunities for affordable housing. Both goals are the responses to long 
time concerns of CD3’s communities, which have been known as a gateway for 
untold numbers of immigrants with many intact tenement-style buildings and a large 
number of low income tenants.  
Although it did little to attack proliferating nighttime establishments, like bars 
and restaurants, which is a major threat to East Village’s local retail businesses and 
quiet residential environment (Community Board Three, 2013), its major drawback in 
the eyes of Chinatown community, the other half of Community District Three, was 
its “exclusion” of the non-write community (Lee, July 15, 2008). The 2008 East 
Village/Lower East Side Rezoning area “protected” 73% of non-Hispanic white 
residents in Community District Three, while only 40% of black, 37% of Hispanic, 
and 23% of Asian were covered, considering with 2000 Census data (Coalition to 
Protect Chinatown and Lower East Side, 2008). Comparably, 35.2% of total 
population in CD 3 was counted as Asian (Department of City Planning, 2012), the 
largest ethnic groups in CB3. 
Chinatown residents attacked the rezoning because it predominately protected the 
north half of CD 3, where non-Hispanic whites were proportionally located and 
median household incomes are higher. It would have negative effects on Chinatown 
and Lower East Side in three ways: 
Firstly, high-rise, high rent development would be pushed out from the East 
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Village to Chinatown, in which under-built lots were plentiful under existing zoning 
designation;  
Secondly, with the possibility of developing higher, landlords would harass 
tenants and kick them out, accelerating the gentrification process. Local retail 
businesses and restaurants may not survive in increasing rents, the historical mix-used 
land use pattern in Chinatown may disappear; 
Thirdly, seeming affordable housing encouraged by the new East Village/Lower 
East Side rezoning was not really affordable for the majority of households in 
Chinatown, while the number of NYCHA housing, Mitchell-Lama Program housing, 
rent-control and rent-stabilization housing were decreasing, threatening housing 
opportunities for the majority of the existing population (Coalition to Protect 
Chinatown and the Lower East Side, 2009). 
To fight against the rezoning, Chinatown community groups formed the 
“Coalition to Protect Chinatown and the Lower East Side”. In August 2008, the 
Coalition hired the Hunter College Community Planning and Development (CCPD) to 
prepare an analysis/critique of the Draft Environmental Impact Statement (DEIS) of 
the East Village and Lower East Side. The analysis reasoned that the DEIS lacked a 
detailed assessment of indirect residential displacement, and it failed to disclose the 
full impact of the rezoning on populations living outside of the rezoned area. By 
asserting the 1/4 mile secondary study area misled conclusions about existing trends 
and development pressures throughout the area, the analysis asked for a consideration 
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of the whole community district within an existing trend and no-action analysis 
(Hunter College Center for Community Planning and Development, 2008).  
However, the existing population trend in Community District Three was a two 
decades decrease of Chinese and other minorities, which is particularly obvious in the 
census tracts surrounding the core Chinatown area. On the other hand, the median rent 
for all renters in the CD 3 has increased 27% since 2005, from $745/month to 
$946/month (Community Board Three, 2013). Consequently, the no-action scenario 
for the rezoning DEIS would still support a trend of gentrifying, not to mention the 
rezoning would incorporate affordable housing incentives as a tool to attack the issue 
of a decreasing stock of low- and middle- income housing. The final EIS did not 
address the problems raised in the CCPD analysis and only identified significant 
impacts and proposed mitigation measures regarding shadows on some of open spaces, 
disturbance of archaeological resources, as well as adverse visual and contextual 
impacts of some inclusionary housing. The CPC zoning amendment report also 
provided no responses to the issues raised in CCPD analysis.  
Being excluded from the 2008 protective rezoning, Chinatown community groups 
initiated their own process of community-based planning (Hollander, Feb 8, 2009). 
Even though three separate community districts, one, two, and three all have a piece 
of Chinatown, Hunter College’s CCPD has been hired to prepare a preliminary  
proposal for “Chinatown/Lower East Side Special Zoning District” (Hunter College 
Department of Urban Affairs and Planning, 2009). The special zoning district 
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proposal divided the district into four subareas, the NYCHA and cooperative housing 
superblocks, the core Chinatown, Lower East Side between Houston and Delancy 
Streets, as well as the East River Waterfront.  
This  plan reflected the Chinatown community’s willingness to fight against 
gentrification. According to a survey conducted in 2008, 25 new hotels, 118 new 
high-end priced boutiques and cafes, and 26 luxury residential buildings had been 
built in the Chinatown area (Lee, March 4, 2009). The special district plan was 
developed to include these major initiatives: 
a. Reducing the maximum allowable as-of-right FAR to a level that reflects the 
existing built environment to prevent exploitation of FAR to develop high-rise 
and high-level uses; 
b. Allow a higher FAR on a case by case basis through community review and 
provision of affordable housing at the neighborhood’s area median income; 
c. Require certification of no-harassment as a condition for demolition, 
renovation and conversion of buildings; 
d. Require special permits for conversion of existing industrial/manufacturing 
space to residential uses, all chain stores, and new community facilities; 
The Chinatown community groups cited the Special Clinton District as a 
precedent for this kind of zoning change. However, all these provisions had just 
existed in 1982 Special Manhattan Bridge Districts. 
Until the present time, authorities have not responded to the Chinatown 
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community groups’ proposal of a special zoning district. The only exception is 
Community Board Three, which addressed it at the end of its comments on East 
Village/Lower East Side rezoning that, “our desire for the future is that DCP and CB3 
must agree to immediately begin a process to review the zoning of parts of our district 
not included in this plan” (City Planning Commission, October 7, 2008). 
Case 4: 2011 Chinatown Business Improvement District 
Despite the lack of response for the Special Chinatown/Lower East Side District 
proposal, the city’s effort to shape Chinatown’s physical environment does not 
completely stop. With the champion of local City Council Member Margaret S. Chin, 
the Chinatown Business Improvement District was established by city council in 
September 2011 (Berger, September 21, 2011). A Business Improvement District 
(BID) is a public / private partnership in which property and business owners elect to 
make a collective contribution to the maintenance, development and promotion of 
their commercial district. New York City is home to the nation's largest, most 
comprehensive network of Business Improvement Districts (BIDs) in the country 
(Department of Small Business Services, 2009). The Chinatown BID boundaries 
include Broome Street on the north; Broadway on the west; Allen and Rutgers streets 
on the east; and White, Worth and Madison streets on the south. The BID 
encompasses 50 blocks, and over 6,000 retail businesses (City Planning Commission, 
March 2, 2011). 
The BID was proposed to collect $1,300,000 in the first year, to provide 
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sanitation, holiday lighting, and contingency needs. $200,000 was planned to spend as 
administrative expenses annually. It collects money based upon a combination of 
linear front footage and assessed value, ranging from $200 to a maximum of $5,000 
annually for commercial establishments. According to The New York Times’ s report, 
35% of owners would pay only the minimum assessment of $200, 74% would pay 
under $1,000 a year, and only a handful would pay the maximum of $5, 000 (Berger, 
September 21, 2011).  
The Chinatown BID was an initiative that the Chinatown community employed 
to promote its street sanitation and festival decoration as an important effort to attract 
tourists. As early as 2002, the Asian American Federation report has revealed that 
street sanitation was of the highest public concern to revitalize the community after 
the attack of September 11, 2001(Asian American Federation of New York, 2002). 
Actually, the communities’ efforts to improve street environments to attract tourism 
can be traced back to as early as 1950s, and the Chinese Consolidated Benevolent 
Association’s efforts to collaborate with the state housing division to redevelop the 
core Chinatown, creating a Orientalism-style housing project named “China Village” 
(Wishnoff, 2008). The DCP’s street revitalization plan in 1976, as well as the 
Chinatown Tourism Council created in 1980s to operate tourism trolleys, also consists 
as a part of efforts.  
Since the early time of Manhattan’s Chinatown, tourism has been an important 
industry. Restaurants, jewelry stores and a series of local businesses rely on tourists. 
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These tourism businesses brings income to a significant number of low-income 
people and new immigrants who lack professional skills and are not fluent in English. 
However, at the present time, the pressure of attracting tourism has been much bigger 
than decades ago, simply because Manhattan’s Chinatown is no longer the only, even 
the largest, Chinese enclaves in New York region. Flushing in Queens, has grew 
rapidly in terms of restaurants and other tourism-related services. Incorporating new 
immigrants from all different regions of China, Flushing provides more authentic 
Chinese foods than Manhattan’s Chinatown, which is competitive in attracting new 
Chinese immigrants and students in the whole city region, and even the whole country. 
Comparably, Manhattan’s Chinatown’s restaurant services and flavor are outdated and 
Canton-style dominated. The Chinatown BID may help the traditional Chinese 
community to show more traditional aspects of China to attract tourism in festivals 
and events, as well as promote a clean street environment to make trips to Chinatown 
more comfortable (Picture 3).  
VI. Analysis: Why Chinatown Has Gentrified Later than Other 
Communities in Downtown Manhattan? 
To answer the question why Chinatown has gentrified later than other 
communities in downtown Manhattan, it is important to identify players of 
for-gentrification and against-gentrification.  




Real Estate Investor and Developer: Since 1970s, overseas Chinese investment 
has started to pour money in Chinatown in its real estate market. From buying 
properties to redevelop to new buildings, international investment played an initiative 
role in boosting Chinatown’s real estate market. They tend to develop luxury housings 
to replace existing dilapidated tenant buildings, therefore decrease Chinatown’s 
low-income housing stock.  
Banks: Since 1980s, more than half of real estate investments made in Chinatown 
were provided by oversea banks. Local Chinese-owned banks also played important 
role in real estate investment. Banks seek profit through high return rate investments, 
their investment support luxury residential and office development, and rely on it to 
earn higher profit.    
Property Owners: Since late 1970s, most properties in core Chinatown and even 
some parts of Little Italy have been transferred under titles of Chinese owners. These 
properties are generally operated in rent-control or rent-stabilization program, which 
makes property owners not easy to evict tenants and sell for redevelopment. In a 
series of conflicts relating to anti-gentrification, property owners are firstly under 
attack for their tenant harassments activity. However they still in favor of new 
development. Property owners, developers and banks are in a chain to develop 
Chinatown, in a sense, to gentrify Chinatown.  
Buyers (percentage of Chinese in change): as described in Case 2, Buyers in 
1980s of the luxury buildings are majorly local wealthy who own businesses, work or 
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even grow up in Chinatown, even though a significant number of buyers are well-off 
immigrants for Hong Kong and Taiwan. When Chinatown refuses to build enough 
more luxury housings and sell to them, they went to outer-boroughs. They settle down 
in outer-borough Chinese communities like Corona, Queens and Sheepshead Bay, 
Brooklyn, household income and home ownership are much higher than those of 
Chinatown. 
Against Gentrification: 
Tenants: Chinatown has been traditionally  low-income community since 19th 
Century Chinese move to New York City. Most of Chinese live in Chinatown were 
low income tenants. Public endorsed low and middle income housing program, like 
rent control, rent stabilization, Mitchell-Lama housing (Confucius Plaza), and 
NYCHA housing, provide Chinatown residents to pay relatively cheaper rent to stay, 
although rent has been grew rapidly in these years, according to Community Board 
Three.  
Small Businesses Owners: Influx of well-off residents induces more adverse 
impacts than benefits to local small businesses. Chinatown small businesses are 
targeted at low and middle classes; well-off residents are inclined to shop around the 
city rather than their nearby community. While luxury residential developments pull 
up surrounding housing and rent prices, local small businesses may face increasing 
rent.  
Employees in Local Small Businesses: People employed in Chinatown live in 
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Chinatown, perhaps next door to their working place. With the increasing of rent, 
employees have moved out of Chinatown, taking subways, private buses or employers’ 
van to commute. Increasing gentrification process may cause higher percentage of 
employees to commute. 
New Immigrants: although new immigrants have multi-choices to live close to 
their country fellows, Chinatown is still the major concentration of the largest Chinese 
immigrants group, Fujian people. Fujian immigrants come to New York City are 
inclined to live in Chinatown, as the Cantonese a hundred years ago, relying on their 
clanmen fellow community to get a job, learn English and adapt themselves to live in 
new environment.  
Government is difficult to count as for-gentrification or against-gentrification. As 
Lin pointed out (1995), city government has the incentive to enable and encourage 
new development (usually gentrifying), to gain tax income and replace existing 
housing in dilapidating condition; while incentive to preserve local small businesses 
to ensure employment also count. In terms of Manhattan’s Chinatown, to facilitate the 
Chinese enclaves’ capacity as a tourism destination significantly draws city 
government’s eye balls. Establishing Special Manhattan Bridge District, as well as 
facilitating Chinatown BID reflects city government’s willingness to encourage new 
development and promoting tourism. However, adding tenant protection clause, 
encouraging providing affordable housing to the special district requirement, making 
minimum BID assessments for most of small businesses reveal local government’s 
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side of supporting low income population and small businesses. 
Within government system, city government has the least ability and resources to 
support affordable housing and fight against gentrification. Public housing projects in 
the Lower East Side and the Mitchell-Lama housing project, Confucius Plaza, took a 
lot of federal and state money to accomplish. The city has no fiscal ability to directly 
construct and provide new affordable housings. Comparably, it costs much less for 
city government to deregulate development control and facilitate new development, 
let alone the benefits city governments may acquire from new development.  
2. Why Chinatown Has Gentrified Later than Other Communities 
in Downtown Manhattan? 
When we look back to the second half of 20th Century history of planning in 
Chinatown, we can get some suggestions to answer the question, why Chinatown has 
gentrified later than other communities in downtown Manhattan. 
a. Unfavorable physical environment: In the second half of 20th century, a series 
of government buildings (courthouses, jails) and public housing projects 
have been built to the south and east of the Manhattan’s Chinatown. This is 
not an attractive environment for well-off communities. Comparably, other 
communities in downtown Manhattan are relatively further from these 
governmental buildings and public housings. 
b. Unique demographic condition: Comparing with other ethnic groups like 
Italian, Irish, and Jewish in other downtown communities, Chinese are more 
excluded, both submissively (exclusion acts since 1880s) and proactively (to 
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avoid language barrier, and support each other in family associations). New 
immigrants of those ethnic groups move in downtown enclaves and finally 
move out when find out job opportunities in other places of the country. 
However, Chinatown accommodates generations of Chinese immigrants who 
cannot make a living without a Chinese community. These old immigrants, 
combined with significant numbers of influx of new immigrants since 1960s, 
are economically disadvantaged. Chinese immigrants’ population growth and 
Chinatown’s expansion reinforce Chinatown’s function as a low income 
Chinese ethnic enclave. 
c. Community efforts to fight against gentrification: Chinatown has historical 
tradition of community organizations, like family associations and clansmen 
associations. Community organizations play important roles in combat 
against gentrification. Traditional community organizations (Chinese 
Consolidated Benevolent Association, family associations, clansmen 
associations) and emerging community organizations (Chinatown Planning 
Council, Asian American for Equality, Chinese Staff and Workers 
Association, etc.) fight against gentrifying land use policies and luxury 
housing development (as showed in Case 2) through street petitions, lawsuits, 
and tenants trainings. Since new Chinese immigrants are increasingly 
well-off people with capital to invest in the U.S., Chinatown faces pressure 
of gentrification inside the ethnic group. Strong community power against 
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gentrification pushes out well-off Chinese, forcing the well-off Chinese to 
settle down in outer-boroughs and build new Chinese communities.  
d. Lack of public money to develop Chinatown: In the Chinatown planning 
history of second half of 20th Century, a series of public project have 
tremendously shaped Chinatown, among them are the public housing 
projects, Confucius Plaza, Men’s Detention House, U.S. District Courthouse, 
etc. However, these construction were strongly depended on federal and state 
investment. The city government lacks money to improve public 
environment in Chinatown. Traffic congestion, poor street sanitation 
condition, and public facilities lack of maintenance make Chinatown an 
unfavorable place for well-off residents. Establishment of Chinatown BID in 
2011 is going to make a change. With the dollars of local businesses, instead 
of the local government, Chinatown’s sanitation and public facilities 
performance and environment is going to improve. However, significant 
public input is still far from sufficient.  
Unfavorable surrounding environment of government buildings and public 
housings, persisting function as low income Chinese enclave, and poor transportation 
and street sanitation performance are reasons to the question that why Chinatown is 
not a favorable community to well-off residents. The communities’ antagonism 
towards gentrification also makes it difficult for well-off population to move in. These 
are reasons answering the question why Chinatown has been gentrified later than 
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other communities in downtown Manhattan. 
VII. Conclusion and Recommendations: Towards the Future of 
Manhattan’s Chinatown 
Chinatown is gentrified later than other downtown Manhattan communities, 
which does not mean that Chinatown is not gentrifying. Gentrification is itself a 
neutral process. There is increasing number of young middle class attracted by 
Chinatown’s pedestrian friendly streets and vibrant commercial environment. Not 
only oversea investors from mainland China interested in Chinatown’s real estate 
development, according to an interview with the Asian American for Equality, new 
residents who move in Chinatown recently are more non-Asian races and moderate, 
upper income. Chinatown faces growing pressure of gentrification. Based on this 
planning history analysis, following policy recommendations are proposed for 
Chinatown community groups: 
1. Making Effort on Rezoning Chinatown, and Preparing for a 
Chinatown 197-A Plan 
Section 197-a of the City Charter authorizes the development of community 
based plans. When a 197-a plan approved by City Planning Commission and adopted 
by the City Council, it is legalized to provide guidance for future actions of city 
agencies in the areas addressed. In the 197-a plan process, consensus-building will be 
promoted among various local groups, dialogue between the community and city 
agencies will be encouraged, a shared vision for the community will be set forth. 
There are numerous Chinatown community groups working to improve the living 
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standard and fight against gentrification, while it is difficult for them to work 
cohesively. Preparing a Section 197-a plan serves a valuable opportunity to put 
different efforts together and inform the whole community about its future goals. The 
city may also understand needs of Chinatown community and carry out plan 
recommendations, particularly those related to proposed rezonings. The Special 
Manhattan Bridge District plan could be used as a precedent for a plan to include 
anti-harassment and anti-demolition provisions. A higher percentage of affordable 
housing provision and significant inclusive housing bonus should be negotiated.  
2. Improving Local Businesses and Commercial Environment with 
the Goal to Make Chinatown the “Downtown for Asian 
Population” 
Manhattan’s Chinatown is the “downtown” for Asian population in the city 
region. Asian population cannot live without a Chinatown, simply because they need 
to visit food markets in Chinatown to buy Asian ingredients for their cooking. What 
are important to them also include visiting Asian clinics and take Traditional Chinese 
Medicines, worshipping in Buddha temples, enjoying Asian food with friends and 
relatives in Chinatown restaurants (having-dinner-together as an important activity for 
social networking). Although they no longer have to rely on ethnic organizations, they 
visit Chinatown periodically. Every weekend, Manhattan’s Chinatown’s streets are 
crowded with visiting Asian residents from other parts of the whole city region.  
Thousands of Chinatown small and middle businesses, supermarkets, restaurants, 
Traditional Chinese Medicine drug stores, and even barber shops, are the destinations 
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of these visitors. Chinatown is a good place to eat, drink and shop. It provides a city 
life experience like the American downtowns in 19th century provided not only for the 
Asian, but also all visitors. Realizing this, it is important for local business groups to 
plan for improving sanitation services, public facilities, public events to attract 
visitors, and ensuring commercial spaces on reasonable rent to keep anchor stores. 
Flushing, Queens, the biggest competitor for Chinatown in the metropolitan area has 
its BID seven years earlier than Chinatown5. Promoting shopping environment and 
keeping anchor businesses to stay is also important in the competition. If Chinatown 
can persist as a commercial center, it will be difficult to harmonize to a well-off 
community like all other downtown communities.  
On another hand, food and services quality in Flushing are quickly updated to the 
developments in Asia, which attracts not only Asian population in New York City, 
even visitors from the whole country. Large shopping malls and department stores 
have been located in Flushing, working as the major attractions for visitors; however, 
there are no successful large businesses in Manhattan’s Chinatown. There is still a lot 
of effort to make to promote Chinatown as the downtown for regional Asian 
population.   
3. Community Groups Should Put More Efforts to Do “Inside Work” 
and “Play within the Rule” 
Chinatown community groups have a long tradition of fighting against unfair 
treatment, usually through street petition and lawsuits. From the case studies, we can 
                                                     
5 The Downtown Flushing Transit Hub Business Improvement District was formed in September 2003.  
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see sometimes it works, but it does not necessarily achieve the community goal. On 
another hand, making the community a “troublemaker” in the eyes of city government 
does not bring real benefits. It is unlikely Chinatown groups will be granted public 
money if they do not win the city’s trust. They should work with the city and other 
levels of governments to win their trust and get their dollars to help the community, 
by which these groups may have bigger impact on the governmental decision making 
process in favor of the interest of the community.  
Asian American for Equality (AAFE), the biggest community group in 
Chinatown working to provide affordable housing, used to file lawsuit again the city 
and luxury housing developers in 1980s, has started to work closely with city, state 
and federal governments, building relationships with the governmental officials. In 
the post-Sandy recovery, AAFE get outsourcing services contract from FEMA and 
played a role to help FEMA in distributing services in Chinatown and Lower East 
Side.  
AAFE and other community groups also started to train local tenants to 
understand New York City’s Uniform Land Use Review Procedure and how to 
participate in the public meetings to express their demands. By taking full use of 
existing playing rule, community groups may work more efficiently than “fight from 
outside”. The working of Chinatown BID has improved the physical environment for 
Chinatown, this case also serve to prove that existing mechanism could be employed 
by the community to achieve its improvement, growth and development goal.  
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As ancient Chinese said “looking at the history as a mirror, prosperity and failure 
are seen”, the history may bring contemporary people thoughts and ideas. Preparing 
Section 197a plan to get a consensus within community and build a formal policy 
guideline for city government, improving Chinatown’s business environment with the 
goal to make it the “Downtown for Asian population”, and interacting with the 
governments by doing inside work and playing within the rule, these are the 
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Appendix A: Major Planning-Related Events in Manhattan’s 























































Chart 1: Chinese Population in Five Boroughs of New York City, 1970-2010 Source: 
Minnesota Population Center. National Historical Geographic Information System: Version 
2.0. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota, 2011 
 
 
Chart 2: Chinese Population in Five Boroughs of New York City, 1970-2010 Source: 
Minnesota Population Center. National Historical Geographic Information System: Version 
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Map 1: Manhattan's Fifth Ward in 1895, showing slum block between Baxter and Mulberry 
before its torn-down to make space for Columbus Park in 1911. Source: Bonner, Arthur, Alas! 




Map 2: Location of Manhattan's Chinatown Source: Zoning and Land Use Application, 




Map 3: Median Household Income in Manhattan Downtown Area Source: United States 









Map 5: Research Area of Chinatown Revitalization Study Source: Chinatown Revitalization 
Study, Department of City Planning, 1976  
 
 
Picture 1: Vacant Site on Baxter Street Source: “Vacant Site on Baxter Street”, 40°43'01.15" 












Map 6: Special Manhattan Bridge District Source: C801025ZMM, City Planning Commission, 









Map 7: Existing Zoning of East Village/Lower East Side Rezoning Source: Analysis of Draft 
Environmental Impact Statement for East Village/Lower East Side Rezoning, Hunter College 







Map 8: Proposed Zoning of East Village/Lower East Side Rezoning Source: Analysis of Draft 
Environmental Impact Statement for East Village/Lower East Side Rezoning, Hunter College 







Picture 3: Chinatown BID workers doing street cleaning on Canal Street Source: Nannan Xu, 
2013 
 
 
